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3.1  Introduction 
Generational accounting is a relatively new tool of long-term fiscal analy- 
sis.’ It is based on the government’s intertemporal budget constraint, which 
requires that the government’s bills be  paid by current or future generations. 
These bills refer to the present value of  the government’s projected future 
spending plus the current value of its official net debt. The payments of current 
and future generations are also measured in present value and equal the pro- 
jected value of  their future net tax payments (taxes paid  less transfer pay- 
ments received). 
Generational accounts measure, in present value, the projected future net 
tax payments of  current and future generations. The difference between the 
government’s bills and the collective generational accounts of current gener- 
ations determines the present value of the net tax burden facing future genera- 
tions. Comparisons of  the generational accounts of current and future genera- 
tions indicates the extent to which fiscal policy is, generationally speaking, out 
of balance. Generational accounting also reveals changes in the generational 
distribution of fiscal burdens arising from policy reforms. Since generational 
accounting considers the taxes paid to, and transfers received from, all levels 
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of government (federal, state, and local), it provides a comprehensive picture 
of the fiscal treatment of different generations. 
Although it is less than five years old, generational accounting has made 
significant inroads in fiscal analysis, both in the U.S. and abroad. It has been 
included in the Budget of the United States Government and is being used by 
the governments of Norway, Italy, Japan, and New Zealand. The IMF is prepar- 
ing generational accounts for Sweden, the World Bank is preparing them for 
Thailand, and academic economists have prepared or are preparing them for 
Germany, Canada, and Australia.* 
Given its growing use, it is important to understand the limitations as well 
as advantages of generational accounting. One concern about generational ac- 
counting is the accuracy of its implicit incidence assumptions. Generational 
accounting  assumes that  taxes on labor income are paid  (in the economic 
sense) by workers, that taxes on capital income are paid by suppliers of capital, 
and that sales, excise, and value added taxes are paid by  consumers. It also 
assumes that recipients  (in the economic sense) of transfers,  such as social 
security benefits, are those individuals who receive these payments. Given its 
incidence assumptions, generational accounting simply adds together the taxes 
paid by members of  particular  generations when they work, receive capital 
income, and purchase commodities and subtracts from the total tax  payment 
the total amount of transfer payments received. 
Another way of stating these incidence assumptions is that generational ac- 
counting takes pre-tax factor returns as given; i.e., it ignores potential policy- 
induced changes in factor returns which can alter the ultimate incidence of 
fiscal policies. In addition, generational accounting may not accurately reflect 
those changes in generations’ utility levels associated with their efforts to avoid 
fiscal burdens, such as consuming less of taxed goods. Buiter’s (1997) genera- 
tional accounting critique stresses both shortcomings. 
In  order to set these disadvantages against the advantages of the existing 
method of generational accounting-namely,  its simplicity and clarity-one 
needs  to study,  as  this  paper  does,  their  magnitude.  This  paper  uses  the 
Auerbach-Kotlikoff  (1  987)  dynamic  life-cycle  model  (henceforth,  the AK 
model)  to  study the  degree to which  generational  accounting captures the 
changes in generations’ utilities  resulting from particular  policy reforms. It 
does so by  simulating a range of alternative policies and comparing the re- 
sulting changes in generations’ utilities with the associated changes in genera- 
tional accounts. Since the AK model can be run as either a closed or a small 
open economy, the paper also sheds light on how an economy’s openness may 
affect the accuracy of its generational accounting. 
In our simulations of closed economies with no capital adjustment costs, 
generational accounting does quite well in capturing the sign pattern and mag- 
2. See U.S. Office of Management and Budget (1992, 1993, 1994), Franco et al. (1994),  Auer- 
bach et al. (1993), Boll et al. (1994). and Gokhale, Raffelhuschen, and Walliser (1995). 45  Generational Accounting in General Equilibrium 
nitudes of generations’ utility changes. This is not entirely surprising. In closed 
economies with  no  adjustment  costs, factor returns  are determined  by  the 
capital-labor ratio. Since the capital stock is fixed in the short run and since 
labor supply is fairly inelastic in the AK model, the capital-labor ratio changes 
gradually  in response  to policy   change^.^  Consequently, factor returns  also 
change gradually. In addition, the income effects from the initial direct changes 
in tax burdens play the key role in altering household saving and labor supply, 
which, in turn, determine the changes in the capital-labor ratio and factor re- 
turns. Hence, the changes in factor returns are second-round or  feedback ef- 
fects from the policy change. Since the model is stable, these second-round 
changes in factor returns are smaller in magnitude than the first-round effects, 
which are, to a considerable extent, captured by  changes in generational ac- 
counts. Moreover, although policy-induced changes in behavior are nontrivial, 
they are nonetheless a relatively small factor in generations’ utility changes. 
Adding capital adjustment costs weakens the link between the return to capi- 
tal and the capital-labor ratio. This return is no longer determined simply by 
capital’s marginal product (which depends on the capital-labor ratio), but also 
by revaluations of the stock market (the market price of capital). When capital 
adjustment costs are large, policy changes can produce sharp changes in stock 
market valuations that alter generations’ welfare but are not captured in genera- 
tional accounting. This finding-that  generational accounting misses a portion 
of  generations’  changes  in  utilities  in  the  presence  of  sizable adjustment 
costs-needs,  however, to be considered in light of the limited empirical evi- 
dence in support of adjustment costs (Cutler 1988). 
Running the AK model as a small open economy is another way to generate 
significant and immediate changes in factor returns. The reason is that an econ- 
omy’s capital-labor ratio can change instantaneously in response to capital in- 
flows and outflows. Our simulations of corporate tax changes in small open 
economies suggest the need to modify generational accounting in such econo- 
mies by allocating changes in corporate capital income taxes to generations in 
proportion to their labor income. The reason is that an increase in the corporate 
income tax rate in a small open economy will produce an immediate capital 
outflow, thereby lowering the marginal product of labor and the wage; i.e., the 
corporate tax will be immediately shifted to workers. 
The paper continues in section 3.2 by first considering the analogy between 
generational accounting and tax incidence analysis in a supply and demand 
diagram and then using a simple two-period life-cycle model to illustrate how 
one can decompose policy-induced changes in generations’ utilities into three 
components: (1) the change in their generational accounts, (2) the change in 
their factor income, and (3) the change in their economic behavior, which we 
refer to as their net tax avoidance. Section 3.3 presents our simulation model, 
3. The utility function of  the AK model is calibrated based on empirical studies of  U.S. labor 
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Fig. 3.1  Incidence of a wage tax 
and section 3.4 reports our results using the 55-period AK model for closed as 
well as small open economies. In the case of the small open economy, we 
consider both corporate and personal taxation of capital income. Section 3.5 
summarizes our findings and draws conclusions. 
3.2  Fiscal Reforms and Changes in Generations’ Utilities 
3.2.1  Generational Accounting-The  Analogy 
to Incidence in a Simple Static Model 
Before considering the relationship  between  changes in generational  ac- 
counts and changes in utility in a dynamic model, it may be helpful to draw 
the analogy between generational accounting and tax incidence in a simple 
static setting. Figure 3.1 considers a tax on labor. The demand for labor is 
governed by the demand curve D, and the supply of labor is governed by the 
uncompensated supply curve S.  The area BCEF indicates the change in work- 
er’s surplus, i.e., the change in utility that workers experience from the tax. 
Generational accounting, in effect, approximates the change in workers’ sur- 
plus by the change in tax revenue, ACED. In so doing, it fails to subtract from 
the change in tax revenues the tax-induced increase in workers’ factor income, 
ABFD, or add to the change in tax revenues the change in tax avoidance, DEEJ 
Making both of these adjustments produces the exact change in workers’ utility. 
4.  DEF partly reflects the excess burden from the tax. In particular, if one compensates workers 
for the changes in their nominal tax payments and their factor incomes, one would, in effect, 
replace the uncompensated supply curve with  the compensated supply curve and end up with  a 
triangular area equaling the excess burden of the tax. The closer in value are the compensated and 47  Generational Accounting in General Equilibrium 
Clearly, how well the change in tax revenues approximates the change in 
workers’ surplus depends on the relative values of supply and demand elasticit- 
ies. If  supply is perfectly inelastic, the change in tax revenues exactly equals 
the change in workers’ surplus. This also occurs if the change in workers’ pre- 
tax income exactly equals the change in tax avoidance. At the other extreme, 
if  demand is perfectly inelastic, workers’ surplus is unchanged, and the change 
in tax revenues is a very bad measure of workers’ utility change. 
3.2.2  Incidence in a Simple Two-Period Model 
Next consider fiscal incidence in a simple two-period life-cycle model. Each 
generation has the same size population, which we normalize to one, and each 
agent has one unit of  time each period to spend working or enjoying leisure. 
The utility function of  a generation born at time s depends on consumption 
and leisure when young and old; i.e., 
(1) 
where c indexes consumption, M indexes leisure, y indexes young, and o in- 
dexes old. 
Now suppose a change in policy occurs at time t. To understand its welfare 
effects, we need to examine the changes in utility of the old at time t,  the young 
at time t, and all subsequent generations. We  start by considering the old at 
time t, whose consumption is constrained by 
(  2)  c,,  =  k,(l  +  I;)  +  w,(l - Mar) - c,, 
where k, is the capital owned by  the old at time t, To, is the remaining net tax 
payment of the old at time t (their generational account), w,  is the wage per 
unit of labor supply, and r, is the time t return per unit of ~apital.~  The genera- 
tional account of the old at time t, To,,  as well as those of other generations, 
includes all net tax payments, whether or not they are distortionary. 
The budget constraint facing the generation born at time s 2  t is 
us  =  u(cys, COS+l’  Mys’ Mos+l)r 
uncompensated labor supply elasticities (i.e., the smaller in absolute value is the income elastic- 
ity), the greater the degree to which the change in tax avoidance will reflect the excess burden of 
the tax. 
5. To  keep the analysis simple, we assume that the young and old receive the same wage per 
unit of  labor supply at a point in time. 48  Hans Fehr and Laurence J. Kotlikoff 
The term in the large brackets on the right-hand side of (3) is the present value 
of net taxes of the generation born at time s, i.e., its generational account. 
Total net payments of  the young and old at time s 3 t equal government 
consumption spending G,$;  i.e., 
(4)  T,, + cr =  G,. 
Although (4)  appears to ignore government borrowing, it is, in fact, a general 
formulation. As Kotlikoff (chap. 1 in this volume) shows, any government fis- 
cal policy involving borrowing can be relabeled as one in which government 
debt is always zero. 
We  now consider changes in different generations' utilities arising from a 
policy reform introduced at time t. In so doing, we begin with the utility change 
of the elderly at time t who were born in t -  1 : 
Differentiating (2) and using the first-order condition of the elderly at time t, 
which involves marginal after-tax prices, we get the normalized utility change 
where  is the marginal utility of income of the elderly at time t (who were 
born at t - 1), T~,  is the marginal consumption tax rate facing the elderly at 
time t,  B,,  is the marginal tax on labor income facing the elderly at time t, and 
where we have used the fact that at time t,  k, is given, so dk, equals zero. 
In  (6),  the utility change of  the elderly is decomposed into three compo- 
nents: changes in their generational account (-dZ'J,  changes in their factor 
incomes (the first  bracketed term  on  the  equation's  right-hand  side), and 
changes in their tax payments due to changes in their economic behavior (the 
second bracketed term on the right-hand side). The utility change of those born 
at time s 2  t can be similarly decomposed. Differentiating equation (1) and 
using relevant first-order conditions leads to 
9  =  (1 +  T~~)~c~~  +  wS(l - eys)dM, 
(7) 
(1 +  ~os+l)d~o,+l  +  Ws+l(l - eos+l)dMo,+I  + 
1 +  's+l(l -  +,+I) 
where +,,+I is the marginal capital income tax faced by  the elderly at time 
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In (8), the normalized utility change of generation s 2  t consists of the same 
three components encountered in (6): the change in its generational account 
(the first right-hand side term in large brackets), the change in factor income 
(the second right-hand side term in large brackets), and the marginal change 
in tax revenue associated with a change in economic behavior (the third right- 
hand side term in large brackets). 
To determine the generations’ changes in utility arising from a finite, rather 
than an infinitesimal, change in policy, one needs to integrate (6) and (8) over 
a dummy variable indicating the degree to which the policy reform is imple- 
mented. To be more precise, let z run from 0 to 1, where, for example, a value 
of z equal to .5 means that the policy has been 50 percent implemented and a 
value of 1  means it has been fully implemented. The change in utility of gener- 
ation s, for s 2  t -  1, AUs,  is given by 
(9) 
1  1 6US 
AUs  =  I  --dz. 
O  As 6z 
Substituting from (6) and (8) for the integrand in (9) yields an expression for 
generations’ utility change that has three pieces (three areas) corresponding to 
the integrals of the three terms on the right-hand sides of (6) and (8). These 
three areas are exactly analogous to the three areas in figure 3.1; i.e.,  one re- 
flects the change in tax revenues (in this case, changes in generational ac- 
counts), one reflects changes in factor incomes, and one reflects changes in 
tax avoidance. 
To summarize this section, the changes in the utilities of all generations alive 
after a policy reform depend on more than just the changes in their generational 
accounts. Changes in generational accounts will not, except in special circum- 
stances, provide a full accounting of the intergenerational incidence of fiscal 
reforms. Hence, the question is not whether generational accounting gets in- 
tergenerational incidence exactly right. It doesn’t. Rather the question is how 
accurately it approximates true intergenerational incidence. This is the issue 
which we now explore with the AK model. 50  Hans Fehr and Laurence J. Kotlikoff 
3.3  The Auerbach-Kotlikoff Model 
The AK model contains three sectors: households, firms, and government. 
The household sector consists of 55 overlapping generations, with the total 
population growing at a constant rate n. Each adult agent lives for 55 years 
corresponding to ages 21 to 75 and is concerned only with his own welfare; 
i.e., there is no bequest motive. Since all agents within a cohort are identical, 
economic opportunities differ only across cohorts. The model incorporates var- 
iable labor supply, including endogenous retirement. Preferences over current 
and future consumption and leisure are governed by  the CES  utility func- 
tion 
where 6 is the “pure” rate of time preference, p is the intratemporal elasticity 
of substitution between consumption and leisure at each age u, y is the inter- 
temporal elasticity of substitution between consumption of different years, and 
p is the leisure preference  parameter. Since government spending does not 
enter into the utility function, changes in generations’ utilities reflect only the 
incidence of the method of financing the spending. 
Agents are assumed to have perfect foresight and experience realistic growth 
in their wages during their working years. This age-wage profile is separate 
from the general level of wages, the time path of which is determined by the 
model. The model’s production sector is characterized by perfectly competitive 
firms operating with a CES production function. The capital adjustment cost 
function depends on the level of investment at time t, I,, the capital stock at 
time t,  K,, and a coefficient b. It is given by 
The model incorporates income taxes, wage taxes, capital income taxes, and 
consumption taxes, all of  which can be levied at proportional or progressive 
rates. The government’s policy instruments include borrowing and a pay-as- 
you-go social security system. Government policy is constrained by the gov- 
ernment’s intertemporal budget constraint. As mentioned, this constraint re- 
quires that the present value of net taxes of current and future generations be 
sufficient to cover the present value of government consumption plus the value 
of existing government debt. The perfect foresight path of the AK model is 
calculated using an iterative Gauss-Seidel algorithm. The algorithm assumes 
that the economy reaches its new steady state after 150 years. Table 3.1 dis- 
plays our baseline parameter values. 
Our simulations all start in year 1 from an initial steady state. They are quite 
similar to simulations reported in Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), and conse- 51  Generational Accounting in General Equilibrium 
Table 3.1  Baseline Parameters 
Parameter  Value 
Population growth rate  0.01 
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution (y)  0.25 
Intratemporal elasticity of substitution (p)  0.80 
Pure rate of  time preference  0.015 
Leisure preference parameter  1.5 
1  .O  Elasticity of  substitution between capital and labor 
quently, we provide only a brief description  of  their  impacts on macroeco- 
nomic variables. Our initial steady state features a 20 percent income tax which 
is used to finance public consumption, no government debt, and, except where 
indicated, no social security system. After solving for the transition path of the 
economy arising from a change in fiscal policy, we compute the difference 
between each generation’s utility under the new policy and the initial steady- 
state level of utility, which represents the utility that the generation would have 
realized in the absence of the policy change. 
Generations’ changes in utility are divided by the post-policy-reform mar- 
ginal utilities of income. Changes in generational accounts and factor incomes 
are calculated using the post-policy-reform  pre-tax interest rates to discount 
changes in net tax payments and factor income.6 In order to approximate AUs 
in (9) and the integrals of the three right-hand-side components of (6) and (8), 
we simulated each policy reform in five steps.7  Then we (a) added together the 
resulting ratios of the change in utility divided by the marginal utility of  in- 
come in that step, (b) added together changes in the net tax payments and factor 
incomes discounted  at  the interest rate in that  step, and  (c) computed  the 
change in tax avoidance as the difference between (a) and (b). 
In presenting  our calculated  changes in each generation’s utility, genera- 
tional account, factor income, and tax avoidance, we scale these numbers (di- 
vide them) by the present value of the generation’s  expenditure on consumption 
and leisure, valued at the initial steady-state pre-tax prices. 
3.4  How Well Does Generational Accounting Track 
Changes in Generations’ Utilities? 
This section considers two questions: First, how do changes in generational 
accounts  compare  with  generations’  actual  utility  changes?  Second,  are 
changes in generational accounts less accurate indicators of utility changes for 
young and future generations than they are for older generations because of the 
time needed in closed economies (without adjustment costs) for factor prices 
6. The post-policy-reform pre-tax interest rate in year s is the one that prevails in years in the 
7. Using more than five steps in the numerical integration does not materially affect the results. 
transition to the new steady state. 52  Hans Fehr and Laurence J. Kotlikoff 
Table 3.2  20 Percent, Income-Tax-Financed Increase in Government Spending: 
Transition Path 
























































































to change? We  consider a variety of different policies, including increases in 
government spending financed by raising either income or consumption taxes, 
a partial shift in the tax  structure from income to consumption taxation, a 
deficit-financed short-term tax cut, and an expansion of  social security ben- 
efits8 
3.4.1 
Financing Additional Government Spending 
Our first simulation involves a permanent 20 percent rise in government 
spending financed by an increase in the rate of income taxation. As one would 
expect, this policy crowds out capital, lowers the real wage, and raises the real 
interest rate. Table 3.2 reports initial steady-state (year 0) macro variables as 
well as the values of these variables along the economy’s transition path. The 
capital stock, which initially equals 89.9, declines over time to 83.9. Associated 
with this decline is a 2 percent long-run decline in the wage and a 5 basis 
point increase in the interest rate. The income tax rate converges over time to 
24.2 percent. 
The first three columns of  table 3.3 decompose each generation’s utility 
change into changes in its generational account (multiplied by minus l),  factor 
income, and tax avoidance. The total change in utility is given in the fourth 
column. Since the tax avoidance column is calculated as the difference be- 
tween the sum of the first two columns and the fourth column, the tax avoid- 
ance figures will pick up the error in our method of approximating the integrals 
of the components of the change in utility. 
Generational Accounting in a Closed Economy 
8. Although we report results for only a fixed set of  parameters, we have run our policy experi- 
ments for a wide range of  alternative parameters and found essentially the same results with re- 
spect to the ability of changes in generational accounts to track changes in welfare. 53  Generational Accounting in General Equilibrium 
Table 3.3  20 Percent, Income-Tax-Financed  Increase in Government Spending: 
Decomposing Generations’  Utility Changes 
Generation’s  Generational  Factor  Tax  Generation’s 
Year of  Birth  Account  Income  Avoidance  Utility 
-54 
-  50 
-  45 
-  40 
-35 
-  30 
-  25 
-  20 
-  15 









































































-  3.07 
-3.14 
-3.15 
Note: Table reports changes, expressed as percentages of remaining lifetime expenditure. 
In general, generational accounting does a very good job in this simulation 
in approximating generations’ changes in utility. For the oldest generation, the 
change in generational account equals 91 percent of  the total utility change. 
For 30-year-olds it equals 98 percent of the total, and for those born in year 0, 
the year before the policy is enacted, it equals 78 percent of  the total. For 
generations born after the transition begins, however, generational accounting 
does less well. For example, in the case of  those born in the long run, the 
change in generational accounts equals 67 percent of the total change in utility. 
The slow rate at which factor prices change in this simulation is the main 
reason that changes in generational accounts provide a worse approximation 
to utility changes of  younger generations. The younger the generation, the 
more of its lifetime will be spent experiencing the lower wage, but higher inter- 
est rate, resulting from the policy change. For example, those born in the new 
steady state earn a 2 percent lower wage for their work effort and a 5 basis 
point higher interest rate on their savings. 
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 report the results of a simulation that is identical to that 
underlying tables 3.2 and 3.3 with the exception that the increase in govern- 
ment spending is financed using a proportional consumption tax. Unlike the 
income-tax-financed increase in government spending, there is no crowding 
out of  capital. Indeed, there is some minor crowding in. The reason is that 
the consumption tax falls more heavily on the initial elderly who have high 
propensities to consume. Since there is very little change in capital per work, 54  Hans Fehr and Laurence J. Kotlikoff 
Table 3.4  20 Percent, Consumption-Tax-Financed  Increase in Government 
Spending: Transition Path” 
~  ~  ~~~  ~  ~~  ~~ 
Interest  Consumption  Saving 












89.9  19.2  25.7  1.OOO 
89.9  19.4  25.8  ,998 
89.9  19.4  25.8  .998 
89.9  19.4  25.8  ,998 
89.9  19.4  25.8  ,998 
89.9  19.4  25.8  .998 
90.0  19.4  25.8  ,999 
90.1  19.4  25.8  ,989 
90.1  19.4  25.8  ,989 
90.1  19.4  25.8  .999 










,000  ,035 
,053  ,036 
,053  ,036 
,053  ,035 
.053  ,035 
,053  .035 
,053  .035 
,053  ,035 
.053  ,035 
.053  ,035 
aSimulation includes a 20 percent proportional income tax. 
Table 3.5  20 Percent, Consumption-Tax-Financed  Increase in Government 
Spending: Decomposing Generations’  Utility Changes 
Generation’s  Generational  Factor  Tax  Generation’s 
Year of Birth  Account  Income  Avoidance  Utility 
-  54 
-50 
-  45 
-40 
-35 
-  30 
-  25 
-  20 
-  15 
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Note:  Table reports changes, expressed as percentages of remaining lifetime expenditure. 
there is little change in either the wage or interest rate. Hence, the factor in- 
come changes reported in table 3.5 are quite small. The changes in generational 
accounts of particular generations are, however, significant. These changes ac- 
count for most of the changes in generations’ utility levels. The fraction of the 
utility change captured by  the change in  generational accounts ranges from 
98 percent for the oldest cohort to 81 percent for cohorts born in the new 
steady state. 55  Generational Accounting in General Equilibrium 
Table 3.6  Structural Tax Reform: Transition Path" 
Interest  Consumption  Saving 
Year  Capital  Labor  Output  Wage  Rate  Tax Rate  Rate 
0  89.9  19.2  25.7 
1  89.9  19.5  25.9 
2  90.4  19.5  25.9 
3  90.8  19.5  25.9 
4  91.3  19.4  26.0 
5  91.7  19.4  26.0 
10  93.4  19.4  26.0 
20  95.5  19.3  26.1 
60  97.2  19.2  26.1 
m  97.3  19.2  26.1 
1  .Ooo 
,997 
,998 





































"Simulation entails an immediate and permanent reduction in a proportional income tax from 20 
percent to 15 percent with the reduction in revenues made up through the introduction of a propor- 
tional consumption tax. 
Tgble 3.7 
Generation's  Generational  Factor  Tax  Generation's 
Year of  Birth  Account  Income  Avoidance  Utility 
Structural Tax Reform: Decomposing Generations'  Utility Changes 
-54 
-  50 
-  45 
-40 
-35 
-  30 
-  25 
-  20 
-  15 












































































Note:  Table reports changes, expressed as percentages of remaining lifetime expenditure, 
Structural Tan Change 
Our next simulation, the macroeconomic and utility effects of  which are 
reported in tables 3.6 and 3.7, holds government spending fixed but switches 
the tax structure from a 20 percent income tax to a 15 percent income tax plus 
a consumption tax whose rate is set to maintain the same revenues on an annual 
basis. In the first year of the transition the consumption tax is 6.4 percent and 
falls through time to 6.1 percent. In the long run, the capital stock increases 56  Hans Fehr and Laurence J. Kotlikoff 
(relative to its initial steady-state value) by 8.2 percent, the wage rises by  2.1 
percent, and the pre-tax interest rate falls by 4 basis points. 
As table 3.7  indicates, changes in generational accounts again  do a very 
good job in capturing the general pattern of generation-specific utility changes. 
They do less well, for certain generations, in capturing the magnitude of those 
generations’ utility changes. The changes in generational accounts are pretty 
close to the changes in utility for those initially over age 25. Unlike tables 3.3 
and  3.5, however, changes in generational  accounts capture only about one 
third of the utility change for generations born in the long run. 
The pattern of factor income changes in table 3.7 deserves comment. In the 
first two years following the reform the substitution effects of a lower tax on 
labor income induces an increase in labor supply. This lowers the capital-labor 
ratio, reducing the real wage and raising the interest rate. The oldest gener- 
ations benefit from this increase in the interest rate, which explains why the 
changes in factor incomes for those born 50 and 54 years before the reform are 
positive. Through time, the capital stock rises in response to the partial shifting 
of the burden of taxation from the young, with low propensities to consume, 
onto the elderly, with high propensities to con~ume.~  This raises the wage. The 
income effects of this higher wage reduce labor supply, leaving labor supply 
in the new steady state at its initial steady-state value (at least to one decimal 
place). The increase, along the transition path, in the wage benefits initial fu- 
ture generations the most, because they work primarily or exclusively during 
years when the wage has reached or neared its peak. The counterpart of the 
rise in the wage is a decline in the interest rate. The loss to initial young and 
middle-aged generations from the lower interest income they receive on their 
accumulated assets exceeds the gain to these generations of the rising wage. 
On net, they experience a decline in their factor incomes, whereas future gen- 
erations experience, on net, an increase. 
In this and the previous two simulations a pattern is emerging that merits 
comment; namely, generational accounting is providing a lower bound esti- 
mate of the absolute change in welfare of those born in the long run. The rea- 
son is that policies which, over time, lower (raise) the economy’s level of capi- 
tal intensity are generally policies which redistribute from young and future 
(older) generations  toward  older  (young  and  future)  generations.’O Since a 
lower  (higher) long-run  degree  of  capital  intensity  means  a lower (higher) 
long-run wage, the direct redistribution from those alive in the long run, which 
is captured by generational accounting, will understate the reduction (improve- 
ment) in welfare of those born in the long run. 
9. Recall that in the life-cycle model, propensities to consume rise with age in light of  the 
shorter remaining life span. 
10. Income effects generally play a much more important role than do substitution effects in 
altering consumption and labor supply decisions, and policies that redistribute toward older gener- 
ations  are  policies  that  redistribute  toward  generations  with  higher  marginal  propensities  to 
consume. 57  Generational Accounting in General Equilibrium 
Table 3.8  Deficit-Financed Three-Year Income Tax Cut:  Transition Path 
Interest  Income  Saving 











89.9  19.2  25.7  1.000 
89.9  19.8  26.2  ,993 
90.1  19.8  26.2  ,994 
90.4  19.8  26.2  .994 
90.6  19.1  25.5  1.004 
90.4  19.1  25.5  1.003 
89.6  19.1  25.5  1.001 
88.4  19.1  25.4  .997 
86.8  19.2  25.4  .992 
































Tables 3.8 and 3.9 consider the effects of a deficit-financed temporary tax 
cut, specifically a three-year reduction from 20 percent to 16 percent in the 
rate of income taxation. After the three-year period, debt per capita is held 
fixed and the income tax rate is increased in order to cover government spend- 
ing and interest on this level of debt. As table 3.8 shows, the policy crowds in 
capital in the short run, but crowds out capital in the long run. The reason is 
the short-run increase in labor supply and earnings (some of which is saved) 
arising from the substitution effects associated with the temporary tax cut; i.e., 
in the short run, when taxes are temporarily low, workers have an increased 
incentive to supply more labor. Once tax rates are raised, this incentive effect 
disappears. In the long run, the wage ends up 0.8 percent lower and the interest 
rate 2 basis points higher. These are small changes in relative factor returns. 
Accordingly, generation-specific changes in factor incomes reported in table 
3.9 are quite small. 
There is, however, a substantial intergenerational  redistribution  from the 
policy, most of  which is picked up by the changes in generational accounts. 
The policy is particularly advantageous to the oldest cohorts, because many 
are deceased after the tax rate is raised. Generational account changes are quite 
similar to generations’ utility changes for all generations already born at the 
time of the policy change. For example, for those aged 35 at the time of the 
policy change, the change in generational accounts equals 0.32 percent of re- 
maining lifetime expenditures, whereas the change in utility is equivalent to a 
0.35 percent reduction in expenditure. For generations born after the policy’s 
enactment, generational account changes capture from 57 percent to 98 per- 
cent of the corresponding utility changes. Again, since this policy ultimately 
crowds out capital by  redistributing  to early from later generations, genera- 
tional accounting provides a lower bound for the decline in the welfare of long- 
run generations. 58  Hans Fehr and Laurence J. Kotlikoff 
Table 3.9  Deficit-Financed Three-Year Income Tax Cut: Decomposing 
Generations’ Utility Changes 
Generation’s  Generational  Factor  Tax  Generation’s 
Year of Birth  Account  Income  Avoidance  Utility 
-54 
-50 
-  45 
-  40 
-35 
-30 
-  25 
-  20 













































































Note: Table reports changes, expressed as percentages of remaining lifetime expenditure 
Increasing Social Security BeneJits 
In tables 3.10 and 3.11 we simulate a 25 percent increase in social security 
benefits starting with a “pay-as-you-go” social security system with a 40 per- 
cent benefit replacement rate. In the AK  model, social security benefits are 
received at age 46 and continued until death at age 55. The actual benefits a 
generation receives are calculated from the average earnings over the first 45 
years of  their life span times the replacement rate, a parameter set by the gov- 
ernment. Given the total sum of the benefits for a given year, the social security 
tax is calculated endogenously to meet social security benefit payments. 
Table 3.10 shows that the policy crowds out the capital stock, reducing, in 
the process, the wage by  1.2 percent. The social security payroll tax, which is 
initially 6.5 percent, rises to over 8 percent. The income tax rate (not shown) 
rises from 20.0 percent to 20.4 percent. As in the previous simulations, the 
changes in capital intensity occur slowly. Consequently, the changes in genera- 
tional accounts reported in table 3. l l do an excellent  job in capturing the utility 
of  generations initially alive. They also capture over 60 percent of the utility 
changes of those born in the long run. 
Adjustment Costs 
Up to now we have assumed that the economy exhibits no adjustment costs, 
i.e., that the installation of  new capital is costless. As described by  Hayashi 
( 1982), increasing marginal costs of investment generate inframarginal rents 
to existing capital. The market valuation of the existing capital stock will there- 59  Generational Accounting in General Equilibrium 
Table 3.10  25 Percent Increase in Social Security Benefits: Transition Path 
Social 
Interest  Security  Saving 











76.4  18.5  24.6  1.000 
76.4  18.1  24.3  1.005 
76.0  18.1  24.2  1.003 
75.6  18.1  24.2  1.002 
75.2  18.2  24.2  1  .Ooo 
74.9  18.2  24.2  ,999 
73.6  18.2  24.2  ,994 
72.6  18.3  24.1  ,990 
72.1  18.3  24.1  .988 































Table 3.11  20 Percent Increase in Social Security Benefits: Decomposing 
Generations' Utility Changes 
Generation's  Generational  Factor  TaX  Generation's 
Year of Birth  Account  Income  Avoidance  Utility 
-  54 
-  50 
-  45 
-  40 
-  35 
-  30 
-  25 
-  20 
-  15 






































































-  1.08 
-1.16 
-  1.22 
-  1.26 
-  1.29 
-  1.29 
Note: Table reports changes, expressed as percentages of remaining lifetime expenditure. 
fore differ from its replacement cost. Tax policies that stimulate (depress) capi- 
tal formation will immediately increase (reduce) the stock market value of ex- 
isting capital."  Since the elderly are the primary owners of existing capital, 
this capital gain (loss) will raise (lower) their wealth and welfare. 
11. This abstracts from investment tax credits and other investment incentives that discriminate 
between new and old (existing) capital and, therefore, change the price of existing capital relative 
to new capital. As described in Auerbach et al. (1991), changes in Q that arise directly because of 
investment incentives are incorporated in the formation of generational accounts. 60  Hans Fehr and Laurence J. Kotlikoff 
Table 3.12  Structural Tax Reform with Capital Adjustment Costs: Transition Path 
Interest  Consumption  Saving 
Year  Capital  Labor  Output  Wage  Rate  Q  Tax Rate  Rate 
0  81.9  19.2 
1  81.9  19.5 
2  82.2  19.4 
3  82.4  19.3 
4  82.6  19.3 
5  82.9  19.3 
10  83.9  19.3 
20  85.4  19.3 
60  88.0  19.2 





















,072  1.100 
.097  1.100 
.072  1.127 
.069  1.130 
.069  1.129 
,069  1.128 
,069  1.123 
.068  1.115 
.067  1.103 
.067  1.100 
.Ooo  ,032 
,046  ,040 
,063  .04 1 
,065  .04  1 
,065  .041 
,065  .04 1 
,064  .040 
,063  ,038 
,061  .035 
.06 1  .034 
In tables 3.12-3.15  we repeat our structural tax reform and deficit-financed 
tax cut but assume an adjustment cost parameter b equal to  10. This value 
for b is reasonably large. It implies that 5 percent of  steady-state investment 
expenditure is spent on adjustment. It also produces a steady-state value of 
Q-the  ratio of  the market value of  capital to its replacement cost-equal 
to 1.10.’* 
Consider first the structural tax reform reported in table 3.12. This reform 
raises the market value of capital in the short run by roughly 3 percent. Over 
time, Q falls back to its initial steady-state value of  1.10. Since older genera- 
tions alive at the time of the tax reform can sell their capital at a 3 percent 
higher price, this capital gain (the value of which is included in the change in 
factor income column in table 3.13) represents an offset to the reduction in 
utility of these generations associated with their being forced to absorb a larger 
tax burden. As table 3.13 shows, the change in generational accounts overstates 
the reduction in welfare of initial older generations. Indeed, for the very oldest 
generation alive at the time of the reform, the true reduction in utility is roughly 
half of that suggested by the change in the generation’s generational account. 
For younger generations and those born shortly after the reform, the change in 
generational accounts provides a fairly accurate assessment of the generations’ 
ultimate change in utility. For those born in the long run, generational account- 
ing captures about one third of the ultimate increase in utility. 
In sum, in this simulation with adjustment costs, the changes in generational 
accounts overstate the losses to the initial elderly and understate the gains to 
the future young. But given the fact that the actual size and importance of 
adjustment costs are uncertain, the changes in generational accounts still repre- 
sent a useful point of  reference for considering the intergenerational welfare 
effects of  this policy. Why? Because they provide, respectively, upper and 
lower bounds on the welfare losses and gains of those who are hurt and helped 
12. Q equals one in the absence of  adjustment costs. 61  Generational Accounting in General Equilibrium 
Table 3.13  Structural Tax Reform with Adjustment Costs: Decomposing 
Generations’  Utility Changes 
Generation’s  Generational  Factor  TaX  Generation’s 
Year of Birth  Account  Income  Avoidance  Utility 
-54 
-  50 
-  45 
-  40 
-35 
-  30 
-25 
-  20 
-  15 












































































Note: Table reports changes, expressed as percentages of  remaining lifetime expenditure 
Table 3.14  Deficit-Financed Three-Year Income Tax Cut with Adjustment Costs: 
Transition Path 
Interest  Income  Saving 











81.9  19.2  25.6  1.OOO 
81.9  19.7  26.1  .994 
82.1  19.7  26.1  ,994 
82.2  19.7  26.1  ,994 
82.3  18.7  25.0  1.008 
82.1  19.3  25.7  ,999 
81.7  19.1  25.5  1.001 
81.1  19.1  25.4  ,999 
79.7  19.2  25.4  .994 











1.100  ,200 
1.100  ,160 
1.115  ,160 
1.114  .160 
1.113  ,237 
1.073  ,192 
1.092  ,206 
1.093  .206 
1.098  .207 











the most by the policy. Thus, they provide a “worse case” scenario which a 
prudent policymaker who is unsure of the extent of general equilibrium price 
adjustments can use in thinking through the costs and benefits of the policy 
reform. 
Turn now to the deficit-financed tax cut policy, the results of which are pre- 
sented in tables 3.14 and 3.15. Due to the initial crowding in of capital in this 
policy, the price of existing capital initially rises. Consequently, the initial el- 62  Hans Fehr and Laurence J. Kotlikoff 
Table 3.15  Deficit-Financed Three-Year Income Tax Cut with Adjustment Costs: 
Decomposing Generations’ Utility Changes 
Generation’s  Generational  Factor  Tax  Generation’s 




-  40 
-35 
-  30 
-25 
-  20 
-  15 












































































Nore: Table reports changes, expressed as percentages of remaining lifetime expenditure. 
derly experience a windfall gain, and their utility improvement exceeds the 
reduction in their generational accounts. Once the tax cut ends, the saving rate 
falls, as does the price of capital. This capital loss produces a temporary de- 
cline in the interest rate. With the exception of those over age 50, the changes 
in generational accounts accord quite closely with the changes in the utilities 
of  those generations alive at the time the policy  is initiated. As in previous 
simulations that involve long-run crowding out of capital, the change in gener- 
ational accounts provides a lower bound for the decline in welfare for those 
alive in the long run. 
Tax Progressivity 
Tables 3.16 and 3.17 report the effects of switching from a 20 percent pro- 
portional income tax to a progressive one, where, as described in Auerbach and 
Kotlikoff (1987), the marginal tax rate is assumed to be linear in the tax base. 
Average tax rates in the year of the tax reform range from 19.1 percent for the 
cohort aged 1, to 21.9 percent for the cohort aged 25, to 15.3 percent for the 
cohort aged 55. The corresponding marginal tax rates are 23.2 percent for 
those initially aged 1, 28.8 for those aged 25, and 15.7 percent for those aged 
55. This age pattern of average and marginal taxes reflects the life-cycle profile 
of income in which income is highest in middle age. The changes in genera- 
tional accounts reflect, of course, not just the immediate changes in a genera- 
tion’s net tax payments, but future changes as well. As table 3.17 shows, the 63  Generational Accounting in General Equilibrium 
Table 3.16  Increasing Tax Progressivity: Transition Path 
Interest  Saving 







































































Table 3.17  Increasing Tax Progressivity: Decomposing Generations’ 
Utility Changes 
Generation’s  Generational  Factor  TaX  Generation’s 
Year of Birth  Account  Income  Avoidance  Utility 
-  54 
-50 
-  45 
-  40 
-35 
-  30 
-  25 
-  20 
-15 









































































-  1.07 
-  1.09 
Note; Table reports changes, expressed as percentages of remaining lifetime expenditure. 
switch to a progressive tax structure lowers the generational accounts of older 
and middle-aged generations, raises the accounts of initial young generations, 
and lowers the accounts of generations born in the long run. 
The policy change produces a very interesting set of dynamics with respect 
to  capital intensity and factor payments. The increase in marginal tax rates 
produces an immediate and sustained decline in labor supply. The initial im- 
pact of less labor supply is a decline in capital intensity and a concomitant rise 
in the wage and decline in the interest rate. Over time, the decline in labor 64  Hans Fehr and Laurence J. Kotlikoff 
earnings plus the increase in consumption associated with the intergenerational 
redistribution toward  the initial elderly crowds out  investment, lowers the 
capital-labor ratio, and lowers the wage. 
The nonlinear pattern of  factor-price changes over the transition coupled 
with significant changes in tax avoidance in response to higher marginal tax 
rates means that changes in generational accounts do poorly in measuring the 
total changes in different generations’ levels of utility. Indeed, in this case the 
sign of the change in generational accounts of those living in the long run is 
opposite to that of their utility change. 
3.4.2  Generational Accounting in a Small Open Economy 
We turn now to generational accounting in a small economy that faces per- 
fectly elastic inflows and outflows of foreign capital. Let r*  stand for the rate 
of return foreigners can earn abroad (after foreign corporate income taxes, but 
before personal capital income taxes). Then since foreign investors must re- 
ceive the same return (before personal capital income taxes) whether they in- 
vest at home or abroad, we have 
wherex( ) is the time s domestic marginal product of capital, which depends 
on the capital-labor ratio ks, and +s  is the time s corporate income tax rate.I3 
According to (12), policy reforms that do not involve changes in corporate 
income taxation will leave pre-tax factor incomes unchanged. The reason is 
that the marginal products of capital as well as labor, which determine the pre- 
tax interest rate and wage, depend on the capital-labor ratio, which, according 
to (12), is pegged by r*. Increases in the corporate tax rate, +,T,  will raise the 
marginal product of  capital and, consequently, lower the capital-labor ratio 
and, thus, the wage; i.e., a corporate income tax increase will be shifted onto 
workers. This suggests the need to modify generational accounting in small 
open economies by allocating corporate income taxes to generations in propor- 
tion to their labor income, rather than their assets. 
To  make this point more precise, suppose that the government of  a two- 
period life-cycle small open economy uses only a corporate income tax to 
finance its spending. Now consider the changes in generations’ utilities associ- 
ated with an increase, beginning at time t, in the rate of  corporate taxation. 
According to (6) and (8), the changes in utilities of the old at time t and those 
born in s 1  t are given by 
and 
13. We assume here thatf’( ) >  0 andf”( ) <  0. 65  Generational Accounting in General Equilibrium 
since all other terms in (6) and (8) are zero. Now competition plus the assump- 
tion of constant returns to scale in production implies that w,  =  flk,) -  f’(ks)ks, 
whereflk,) is output per unit of labor input. Differentiating this expression as 
well as (12) and using the results to rewrite (13) and (14) leads to 
= -(1  - Mo,)dTf  + (1 - Mo,)r*  “  dk, 




(  14’) 
where Tf is corporate tax revenue per unit of labor input. Equations (13‘) and 
(14’) indicate that apportioning changes in the corporate income tax to genera- 
tions in proportion to their labor supply will leave each generation’s change in 
its generational accounts equaling the change in its utility minus terms re- 
flecting corporate tax avoidance arising from net capital outflows. 
Structural Tax Change 
Our first fiscal policy simulation in a small open economy involves a switch 
from income taxation to a combination of income and consumption taxation. 
Specifically we lower the tax on wage and corporate capital income from 20 
percent to 15 percent and make up the loss in revenues by raising the consump- 
tion tax. 
Table 3.18 documents the transition path for the economy under both per- 
sonal and corporate taxation of capital income. In the case of personal capital 
income taxation, we assume that the government of the small open economy 
taxes the capital income received by its residents at the same rate regardless of 
whether that capital income is earned at home or abroad. In this case, (12) is 
replaced by 
which indicates that the pre-tax return to capital is pegged from abroad. This 
also means that the domestic capital-labor ratio and wage are pegged from 
abroad. In calculating changes in generational accounts with personal capital Table 3.18  Generational Accounting in a Small Open Economy; Structural Tax Change: Transition Path' 
Personal Capital Income Tax  Corporate Capital Income Tax 





































































































'Simulation  entails an immediate and permanent reduction in proportional wage income and corporate income taxes from 20 to  15 percent with the reduction in 
revenues made up through the introduction of a proportional consumption tax. 67  Generational Accounting in General Equilibrium 
Table 3.19  Generational Accounting in a Small Open Economy; Structural Tax 
Change: Decomposing Generations’ Utility Changes 
Personal Capital 
Income Tax 
Corporate Capital Income Tax 
Generational Account 
Allocated By 
Generation’s  Generational  Factor 
Year of Birth  Account  Utility  Income  Assets  Labor  Utility 
-  54  -2.35  -2.40  0.00  -2.10  -2.22  -2.27 
-  50  -2.11  -2.02  0.03  -2.00  -2.31  -2.10 
-  45  -  1.62  -  1.54  0.12  -1.61  -2.06  -1.77 
-  40  -1.14  -  1.09  0.23  -1.19  -1.71  -  1.41 
-35  -0.71  -0.67  0.35  -0.80  -  1.32  -1.02 
-  30  -0.35  -0.30  0.46  -0.46  -0.92  -0.63 
-  25  -0.05  0.01  0.57  -0.17  -0.54  -0.25 
-  20  0.17  0.26  0.68  0.06  -0.18  0.09 
-  15  0.31  0.44  0.77  0.23  0.13  0.40 
-  10  0.39  0.54  0.85  0.34  0.38  0.64 
-5  0.39  0.57  0.90  0.38  0.56  0.81 
0  0.34  0.54  0.93  0.36  0.65  0.9  I 
5  0.35  0.56  0.93  0.34  0.64  0.89 
10  0.36  0.57  0.93  0.32  0.64  0.88 
20  0.37  0.58  0.93  0.30  0.63  0.85 
50  0.37  0.59  0.93  0.29  0.62  0.84 
m  0.37  0.59  0.93  0.29  0.62  0.84 
Note: Table reports changes, expressed as percentages of  remaining lifetime expenditure. 
income taxation, policy-induced changes in personal capital income taxes are 
distributed to domestic residences in proportion to their holdings of assets. 
Under corporate income taxation, the foreign country taxes its residents only 
on their capital income earned at home and does not credit taxes paid to other 
countries for capital income earned in  those countries. Consequently, (12) 
holds, and an increase in the domestic corporate income tax leads to a reduc- 
tion in capital intensity and a decline in the wage. 
As table 3.18 shows, the transition path of  the economy is quite different 
depending on how capital income is taxed at the personal or corporate level in 
our small open economy. Under personal capital income taxation, there are no 
changes in the wage or interest rate. However, there are some minor changes 
over time in the stock of capital and the supply of labor (although not in their 
ratio) as labor supply responds to the new tax environment. In contrast, under 
the corporate capital income tax, there is an immediate rise in the capital-labor 
ratio (as the decline +s  in [12] implies) and a concomitant 2 percent rise in 
the wage. 
Table  3.19 compares changes in generations’ utility with their changes in 
generational accounts. Consider first the results based  on  personal  capital 68  Hans Fehr and Laurence J. Kotlikoff 
Table 3.20  Generational Accounting in a Small Open Economy; Deficit-Financed 
Three-Year Income Tax Cut: lkansition Path 
Personal Capital Income Tax  Corporate Capital Income Tax 
Saving  Saving 
Year  Capital  Labor  Output  Rate  Capital  Labor  Output  Wage  Rate 
0  89.9  19.2  25.7 
1  93.0  19.9  26.6 
2  92.9  19.9  26.5 
3  92.8  19.9  26.5 
4  88.8  19.0  25.3 
5  88.8  19.0  25.4 
10  89.0  19.1  25.4 
20  89.4  19.1  25.5 
60  90.3  19.3  25.8 































25.7  1.OOO 
27.0  1.013 
27.0  1.013 
27.0  1.013 
25.3  ,997 
25.3  .997 
25.3  ,998 
25.4  ,998 
25.6  .999 











income taxation. In this case, pre-tax factor incomes are unchanged by  the 
change in tax structure, and the changes in generational accounts do a very 
good job for existing generations in approximating actual changes in utility. 
For generations born in the long run, the change in generational accounts rep- 
resents about two thirds the change in utility. 
Turn next to the results based on corporate income taxation. Again, changes 
in generational accounts do a very good job in capturing changes in genera- 
tions’ utilities when the change in corporate tax revenues is allocated by labor 
supply. For the sake of comparison, the table also shows the changes in genera- 
tional accounts resulting from allocating changes in corporate taxes according 
to generations’ holdings of  assets. In this case, changes in generational  ac- 
counts also provide a good approximation to changes in utilities for initial liv- 
ing generations but provide a much poorer approximation for generations alive 
in the long run. 
Debt Policy 
Table 3.20 shows the transition path resulting from running our previously 
discussed debt policy in a small open economy. As in the closed economy, the 
temporary reduction in tax rates leads to temporary increases in labor supply, 
labor earnings, saving, and the capital stock. But here we also have an immedi- 
ate inflow of  capital from abroad. Consequently, the short-run increase in the 
capital stock is greater in the open than in the closed economy (see table 3.8). 
In the case of personal capital income taxation, there is, of course, no change 
in the wage associated with this debt policy. This is not true in the case of 
corporate income taxation. Indeed, with corporate income taxation, the wage 
rises in the very short run by more than 1 percent. This rise in the wage may 
be contrasted with the almost 1 percent short-run decline in the wage that arises 69  Generational Accounting in General Equilibrium 
Table 3.21  Generational  Accounting in a Small Open Eeonomy; Deficit-Financed 
Three-Year Income Tax Cut: Decomposing Generations’  Utility Changes 
~~  ~~~~ 
Personal Capital  Corporate Capital 
Income Tax  Income Tax 
Generation’s  Generational  Generational 
Year of Birth  Account  Utility  Account  Utility 
-  54  0.11  0.11  0.00  0.00 
-50  0.19  0.29  -0.10  0.07 
-  45  0.33  0.37  0.12  0.20 
-  40  0.34  0.37  0.21  0.24 
-35  0.3 1  0.33  0.24  0.25 
-  30  0.26  0.28  0.25  0.25 
-  25  0.21  0.23  0.24  0.23 
-  20  0.15  0.17  0.21  0.20 
-  15  0.09  0.10  0.18  0.16 
-  10  0.03  0.04  0.13  0.11 
-5  -0.02  -0.02  0.08  0.06 
0  -0.07  -0.08  0.03  0.01 
5  -0.37  -0.47  -0.36  -0.40 
10  -0.38  -0.48  -0.34  -0.37 
20  -0.38  -0.48  -0.30  -0.32 
50  -0.38  -0.48  -0.25  -0.26 
m  -0.38  -0.48  -0.26  -0.27 
under the closed economy debt policy. Table 3.21 compares generational ac- 
count and utility changes under both personal and corporate capital income 
taxation. All in all, there is a very close correspondence in the table between 
generational account changes and utility changes. 
Increasing Social Security Benejts 
Our final simulation, the results of  which are reported in tables 3.22 and 
3.23, involves raising social security benefits by  one quarter. The transition 
paths of the economy are similar under both personal and corporate capital 
income taxation. But unlike the closed economy case, in which the long-run 
capital stock was crowded out and the wage fell by  1.2 percent, there is no 
crowding  out  in  these  simulations and  no  long-run change  in  the  wage. 
Changes in generational accounts again do very well in approximating changes 
in generations’ utilities. 
3.5  Conclusion 
This paper shows how changes in generational accounts relate to the gener- 
ational incidence of fiscal policy. Specifically, it uses the Auerbach-Kotlikoff 
dynamic life-cycle simulation model to compare policy-induced changes in 
generational accounts with actual changes in generations’ utilities. The paper 70  Hans Fehr and Laurence J. Kotlikoff 
Table 3.22  Generational  Accounting in a Small Open Economy; 25 Percent Increase in 
Social Security Benefits: lkansition Path 
Personal Capital Income Tax  Corporate Capital Income Tax 
Saving  Saving 
Year  Capital  Labor  Output  Rate  Capital  Labor  Output  Wage  Rate 
0  76.4  18.5 
1  74.2  17.9 
2  74.4  18.0 
3  74.6  18.0 
4  74.8  18.1 
5  74.9  18.1 
10  75.5  18.3 
20  76.2  18.4 
60  76.6  18.5 





















76.4  18.5  24.6  1.000 
72.6  17.8  23.6  ,997 
73.0  17.9  23.7  ,997 
73.4  17.9  23.9  .997 
73.8  18.0  24.0  ,998 
74.1  18.1  24.0  ,998 
75.3  18.3  24.3  ,999 
76.4  18.5  24.6  1.000 
76.4  18.5  24.6  1.OOO 
76.4  18.5  24.6  1.OOO 










Table 3.23  Generational  Accounting in a Small Open Economy; 25 Percent Increase in 
Social Security Benefits: Decomposing Generations' Utility Changes 
Personal Capital  Corporate Capital 
Income Tax  Income Thx 
Generation's  Generational  Generational 
Year of Birth  Account  Utility  Account  Utility 
-  54  3.56  3.62  3.56  3.63 
-50  3.42  3.60  3.45  3.52 
-  45  3.75  3.50  3.7 1  3.27 
-  40  2.04  1.74  2.05  1.60 
-35  1.10  0.86  1.13  0.78 
-30  0.49  0.29  0.55  0.28 
-25  0.07  -0.12  0.14  -0.07 
-20  -0.25  -0.43  -0.17  -0.32 
-15  -0.49  -0.67  -0.41  -0.51 
-  10  -0.68  -0.87  -0.58  -0.66 
-5  -0.81  -  1.01  -0.70  -0.75 
0  -0.90  -1.12  -0.78  -0.81 
5  -0.88  -1.09  -0.70  -0.71 
10  -0.86  -1.07  -0.63  -0.64 
20  -0.86  -1.07  -0.60  -0.59 
50  -0.88  -1.10  -0.64  -0.64 
m  -0.88  -  1.09  -0.64  -0.63 
considers changes in government spending, the tax structure, debt policy, so- 
cial security benefit changes, and tax progressivity. It also considers a subset 
of these policies in an economy with capital adjustment costs and in a small 
open economy in which capital income is taxed either at the personal or corpo- 
rate level. 
In general, changes in generational accounts provide fairly good approxima- 71  Generational Accounting in General Equilibrium 
tions to generations’ actual changes in utilities. The approximations are better 
for living generations. They  are worse for policies that  involve significant 
changes in the degree of tax progressivity and for economies with sizable capi- 
tal adjustment costs. 
Finally, generational accounting needs to be adjusted in  the case of  small 
open economies to take into account the fact that the incidence of  corporate 
taxation is likely to fall on labor. The method of adjustment is simply to allo- 
cate changes in corporate tax revenues to  generations in proportion to their 
labor supply. 
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